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Abstract: 
The use of tolls is being widespread around the world. Its ability to fund 
infrastructure projects and to solve budget constraints have been the main 
rationale behind its renewed interest. However, less attention has been 
payed to the safety effects derived from this policy in a moment of 
increasing concern on road fatalities. Pricing best infrastructures shifts 
some drivers onto worse alternative roads usually not prepared to receive 
high traffic in comparable safety standards. In this paper we provide 
evidence of the existence of this perverse consequence by using an 
international European panel in a two way fixed effects estimation.  
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Summary 
 
The use of tolls is being widespread around the world. Its ability to fund infrastructure 
projects and to solve budget constraints have been the main rationale behind its renewed 
interest. However, less attention has been payed to the safety effects derived from this 
policy in a moment of increasing concern on road fatalities. In the present paper we 
defend that setting tolls produce a perverse outcome in terms of road safety by shifting 
those vehicles not willing to pay for the best quality infrastructure onto lower quality 
adjacent roads. These infrastructures are usually not prepared to receive high levels of 
traffic in similar safety standards, increasing crash risks as a consequence. In order to test 
this hypothesis we use and international European database (CARE) and a two way fixed 
effects semi-log model of estimation. Results show that price regimes in motorways may 
make a difference on road safety outcomes even using aggregate country data. In fact, we 
provide econometric evidence on the positive impacts produced by free motorways on 
road safety outcomes while at the same time, we highlight that tolled motorways lose this 
virtue. These results lead to important public policy implications in the field of 
transportation and infrastructure management. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The trend towards increased tolling of roads is clear (Estache and de Rus, 2000). This 
trend has been documented for less developed countries (Guasch, 2004), as well as for the 
most developed ones (Albalate, Bel and Fageda, 2007). In fact, the recent increase in 
private involvement in road infrastructures, and particularly in the case of motorways, 
makes of tolls an interesting tool to recover investments and to fund infrastructure 
programs. Fishbein and Babbar (1996) consistently argue that this renewed interest in toll 
roads is particularly strong because governments require alternative methods of financing 
transport needs given limited public resources. Thus, given that governments deal with 
competing expenditures and are pressured by budget constraints, the toll is seen as the tool 
able to avoid tax rises and expenditure cuts. 
Unfortunately, tolls have been usually set only taking into account the financial 
breakeven of concessionaires and no weight has been put on other social efficiency 
criteria. Newbery (2000) explains that the usual question considered when setting tolls is 
whether the revenue is high enough to cover capital and operating costs guarantying some 
profit, rather than assuring net social benefits. This view is usually concerned with 
congestion costs as the main externality not internalized by tolls and many researchers 
have devoted their work to show the benefits from using tolls to regulate demands. Some 
recent studies, especially devoted to the use of congestion charges in urban environments 
and its benefits in practice are Parry (2002), Santos (2004), Olszewski and Xie (2005) and 
Hensher and Puckett (2007), among others. 
From the seminal works by Pigou (1920) and Knight (1924), and the pioneer works by 
Walters (1961) and Vickrey (1969), transport economists claim for the internalization of 
externalities using road charges in order to seek efficient allocative outcomes. Nonetheless, 
this concern on pricing road transport was mainly thought to fight congestion costs 
though other externalities like road accidents, environmental pollution and noise have not 
received enough consideration until the last years.1 This concept is known as Pigouvian 
taxation and has remained the leading principle in transport economics on road traffic 
externalities regulation (Button and Verhoef, 1998). 
According to this pattern, less attention has been paid to the safety effects derived from 
establishing tolls. Indeed, road accidents is another road externality which enjoys 
increasing relevance in the current framework of public health awareness. In the present 
paper we defend that setting tolls produce a perverse outcome in terms of road safety by 
1 Nash (2007) argues that recently marginal cost pricing has been extended to include charging for the 
external costs of accidents and environmental impacts as well. 
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shifting those vehicles not willing to pay for the best quality infrastructure onto lower 
quality adjacent roads. These infrastructures are usually not prepared to receive high levels 
of traffic in similar safety standards, increasing crash risks as a consequence. This shift, 
which is usually called re-routing or rat-running effect in the transportation literature, 
produces worse road safety outcomes in the corridor than the situation in which a free 
motorway does not encourage re-routing.  
This perverse outcome gains increasing relevance if we take into account that demand 
for safety is growing and becoming a major concern for policy makers. As a matter of fact, 
as table 1 displays, road traffic injuries are positioned in the highest places in the world 
leading causes of death ranking provided by the World Health Organization (2004). In 
fact, they are the second cause of death for those between 5 and 29 years old, and the third 
for those between 30 and 44 years old. This position denotes its importance as a public 
health threat. 
<< Insert table 1 about here >> 
 
Apart from that, there are economic reasons that make of road safety an important goal 
for any economy as well. Several estimates point out that economic costs associated with 
road accidents are as high as 1% of GDP in low-income economies; 1,5% in middle-
income economies; and as high as 2% in developed economies. For instance, Jacobs, 
Aeron-Thomas and Astrop (2000) estimated worldwide road accident costs in 518$ billion, 
with the costs in low-income countries exceeding the total annual amount received in 
development assistance. These costs are derived from vehicle and other damages, health 
expenditures and waste of production. 
This being said, it is not surprising that concerns with all the above mentioned leads to 
several governments to devote increasing interest in active public policies to be 
implemented to achieve better safety outcomes and to avoid perverse practices which 
increase crash risks. Following this, our study tries to emphasize one of these perverse 
practices which is not considering the safety consequences of establishing tolls in 
motorways.  
Our empirical study focuses on Europe where approximately 1/3 of its motorway 
network is directly charged and its length has grown dramatically in the last years. In 
figure 1 we display the increase of the toll motorway network under ASECAP, which is 
the association of toll motorway concessionaires in Europe, for the decade 1996-2006. As 
is shown, the length of the toll motorway network in Europe has increased almost 50% in 
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ten years.2 All these elements make of Europe an interesting region to compare safety 
outcomes across price regimes. To do so, we use an international panel containing 
information from 15 countries (EU-15) during the period 1991-2003. The method of 
estimation is a two way fixed effects semi-log model which controls for several covariates 
and uses as dependent variable the rate of fatalities per million population.   
 
<< Insert figure 1 about here >> 
 
As results show,  motorways are expected to have positive impacts on road fatalities 
since its quality and characteristics provide better outcomes.3 However, this effect is only 
present when the motorway remains free and loses this positive impact when it is tolled. 
Since technical differences between both free and toll motorways are not relevant, we do 
not expect to find more accidents in tolled motorways than in free motorways due to 
infrastructure reasons.4 In fact, toll motorways yield similar and even safer outcomes in 
comparison with free motorways in a country like Spain where both price regimes 
compose a mixed network in which tolled motorways are over the 20% of total motorway 
network. Hence, the interpretation of our results suggests that pricing motorways play a 
role in road safety outcomes by shifting to the worst road those drivers not willing to pay 
for the safest road. Consequently, this diversion produces more road fatalities in the 
corridor and, as we defend, even using aggregate country data this effect can be identified.  
The present paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide the related 
literature which may serve to introduce close concepts and similar concerns already treated 
by previous works. In the third section we describe the methodology carried out to test the 
main hypothesis and the data used, while in the fourth section we offer and explain our 
main results. Lastly, some concluding remarks can be found in the fifth section.  
 
 
2 Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden are not members of this association, but their small number of 
tolled motorways would not affect the ASECAP’s toll network trend over time. Additionally, Germany is an 
associate member which only charges heavy vehicles and no general tolls are established in its network. For 
this reason ASECAP does not include Germany in its toll motorway network. The rest of EU15 countries are 
included in ASECAP statistical bulletin together with Norway, Croatia, Hungary, Serbia and Slovenia.  
3 However, some works do not find statistically significant the motorway length or even find negative effects. 
These results are usually justified by the presence of high speed and risky behaviour in this network. These 
effects are related to the so-called offsetting behaviour undercovered by Peltzman (1975). 
4 According to statistical data from the Spanish Ministry of Transport, toll motorways yield similar and even 
safer outcomes in comparison with free motorways in a country where both price regimes compose a mixed 
network in which tolled motorways are over the 20% of total motorway network. Even in some countries 
like Italy concessionaires of toll motorways receive incentives to reduce accidents in their network due to the 
construction of a price cap formula regulating their toll adjustment which includes a penalty for the number 
of road accidents. In this sense, private concessionaires have incentives to increase quality standards not only 
to attract more users to increase revenues but also to obtain productivity gains from price cap regulation.  
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II. RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Several studies treated similar concerns related to the hypothesis of the current study or 
already noticed the existence of this shift produced by pricing roads. For instance, May and 
Milne (2000) assert that road charging may encourage widespread diversion onto minor 
routes. In fact, Rothengatter (2004) find that after setting tolls for heavy vehicles in Austria 
truck traffic was being diverted onto streets and roads, what is a clear example of the so-
called “rat-running” effect. According to Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld (1996), this shift 
is positively related to the elasticity of demand and negatively related to the quality of the 
adjacent road producing a shift of some vehicles onto worse roads. The rationale behind 
this is the following: the lower the quality of the adjacent road, the more inelastic the 
demand for the tolled motorway becomes. Moreover, Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2004) 
find that the number of independently owned roads in a network makes road system more 
competitive, even if demand increases at the same rate. A direct consequence is that the 
number of alternatives prevents the toll motorway owner to set high toll levels without 
being hurt from this competition. 
Other authors have already studied the price elasticity of demand in toll motorways. 
However, these estimations are usually based on short sections, tunnels, bridges and 
entrance to big cities making more difficult a reasonable comparison (Oum, Waters and 
Yong, 1992; Hirschman et al. 1995; Yoram, 2001; Loo, 2003; Olszewski and Xie, 2005; 
Courtney and Nishiyama, 2007). Fortunately, Matas and Raymond (1999) evaluate this 
elasticity for the Spanish toll motorways, finding a price elasticity of -0.3 in the short run. 
In the long run, this estimate increases by 50%. 
Besides, they also pointed out that charging motorways generate perverse distortions in 
traffic allocation when taking into account not only the motorway, but also the network in 
which this belongs to. These distortions are supposed to be affected by price elasticities. 
For instance, Hirschman et al. (1995) state that elasticities in toll motorways are strongly 
related to the quality of its free alternative. Consistently, Matas and Raymond (1999) show 
that their estimated elasticity also depends on the quality of the alternative, from its 
composition and congestion. Finally, Wuestefield and Regan (1981) observed different 
elasticities depending on the type of journey made and its frequency. 
The perverse effect analyzed in the current paper was considered by the DfT Feasibility 
Study of Road Pricing in the UK, where can be found that “the impact of re-routing, if it 
were to occur, could in certain places and at certain times result in an increase in accident 
levels. This is due to the increased number of vehicles using smaller roads, not built for a 
high level demand, which could lead to higher accident rates” (Department for Transport, 
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2004; p.143). Following the same rationale, Broughton and Gower (1998) estimated that  a 
10 per cent diversion of motorway traffic from the motorways in Kent (UK) would 
increase the number of injury accidents in its entire county by about 3.5 %. In a previous 
study by Gower, Shearn and Mitchell (1998), they predicted that a toll of 2.5p per mile (at 
1994 prices) would produce that 10 per cent diversion level. In the same direction, 
Broughton and Gower (1998) estimated that this increase in the traffic flow would increase 
the number of injury accidents in the entire county by about 3.5 per cent taking into 
account traffic flows and road capacities. 
In the present paper we use real international data to compare safety impacts from free 
and tolled motorways on the rest of road network. Somewhere else (Albalate, 2007) it is 
found that those routes adjacent to toll motorways in Spain suffer more accidents 
involving victims per km than those adjacent to free motorways after controlling by traffic 
density and composition. The present study contributes to the literature by testing for the 
first time whether price regimes in motorway networks affect road safety outcomes using 
an international data setin a two way fixed effects estimation. Since the literature on road 
externalities has been mainly focused in congestion costs claiming for the use of 
congestion charges as the unique first best pricing approach, our results provide new 
concerns on the use of tolls in interurban motorways.5 Pricing best infrastructures seem to 
produce a safety damage which can be identified even using aggregate country data and it 
is not constrained to national characteristics thanks to the international approach of the 
current study. 
 
III. ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
 
In order to test whether this effect may arise even using international aggregate data, we 
take advantage of one international database containing road safety information for 
European countries. This database, which is named CARE (Community database on 
Accidents on the Roads in Europe), was created by the European Council in order to make 
it possible to identify and quantify road safety problems in the continent (Council Decision 
93/704/EC). Thus, CARE contains country-level data from 1991 to 2005 for European 
Union countries, where data for 2005 are estimates. We only use data up to 2003, before 
EU enlargement, because all variables are not available for 2004. As a consequence, we 
have a sample based on 15 countries during 13 years for the total fatality rate per million 
5 In fact, congestion costs are more prone to appear in urban environments and consequently in access 
motorways to big cities. According to this, interurban tolls are usually not thought to fight congestion but to 
finance infrastructure projects. 
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population, which will serve as the endogenous variable related to road safety outcomes 
(195 observations).6  
The estimation model chosen is a common two way fixed effects semi-log model that 
takes the following form:                                   
 
lnYit = Xst  + si + vt + it                                                (1) 
 
where Yit is the fatality rate per million population in the country i at year t, Xit contains 
the vector of time-varying control covariates and si and vt are country-specific and year-
specific fixed effects. The rationale behind the use of both fixed effects is that country 
fixed effects control for time-invariant country-specific omitted variables and year 
dummies control for national trends. Besides, it is a mean-zero random error. Table 2 
shows the time-varying covariates used and their descriptive statistics.  
 
<< Insert table 2 about here >> 
 
This two way fixed effects is also justified by Hausman test which provides that random 
effects estimates are not consistent in our framework.7 The importance of using time fixed 
effects is also of relevance due to the decreasing trend of road fatalities enjoyed by EU 
countries during the period studied. Figure 2 show that decreasing trend for the EU 
countries. 
 
<<Insert figure 2 about here >> 
 
Additionally, we replicate the estimation in order to control by heteroskedasticity in the 
first place, and to capture any pattern of correlation by using a cluster robust estimation in 
the second place. In the latter case the variance-covariance estimator used takes the 
following form:  
 
V = (X’X)-1 (
1
N
i
 ui’ui) (X’X)-1                                             (2) 
ui = 

T
t 1
eit xit                                                                           (3) 
 
6 According to Eisenberg (2003), the literature traditionally uses as output measures this fatality rate because 
of their accuracy and relevance for policy makers. 
7 Hausman (1978) test measures the correlation between regressors and error term using as a null hypothesis 
that there is no correlation. In our case this is rejected with a Prob>chi2 = 0.0013, and therefore the model 
chosen is fixed effects. 
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where X is the matrix of covariates, N the number of countries, eit denotes the country-
year specific residual and xit the vector of regressors.
8, 9 
Concerning covariates again, we display in table 3 the expected relationships between 
each of them and the rate of road fatalities per population. As the reader can observe, 
economic growth is expected to increase fatalities. Ruhm (1996) and García-Ferrer, De 
Juan and Poncela (2007) show that motor vehicle accidents exhibit a procyclical variation. 
 
<< Insert table 3 about here >> 
 
Two other variables included in the study which capture the use of roads are Vehicle-Km 
and Motorization. The first denotes the annual number passenger cars-Km, weighted by 
the national population. Therefore, this is capturing the degree of road use that an average 
driver enjoys in a given country. On the other hand, motorization denotes the number of 
passenger cars per capita. Although more cars per capita may mean more cars in the road 
and consequently higher risk, this variable is strongly correlated with economic 
development, which at the same time, is strongly and negatively related to road fatalities. In 
fact, the relationship between road fatalities and economic development is not lineal 
(Kopits and Cropper, 2005). Also Anbarci, Escaleras and Register (2006) explain in detail 
that fatality rates increase with economic development in low-income economies but 
become flat or even decreasing after reaching a certain threshold of development. Since our 
sample is based on first world economies, we consider that it is reasonable to expect 
negative relationships between economic development (through motorization) and road 
fatalities according to Kopits and Cropper (2005) results. 
The core of our analysis is found in the infrastructure variables employed. First, we 
control for the presence of motorways as the best road infrastructures which provide the 
highest levels of road safety. Nonetheless, we are interested in distinguishing those kms 
which are tolled from those which are free of payment. Our hypothesis relies on the fact 
that more presence of motorways provides better results on road safety outputs, but these 
decrease when this type of infrastructure is priced. For this reason we expect to find a clear 
decreasing relationship between the shares of motorways in the road network and road 
fatalities, but we want to identify whether this happens for those motorways which are 
tolled as well. Primary roads and secondary roads are variables denoting different levels of 
8 This is known as the White-like formula to compute standard errors (White, 1984).  
9 Since this method is only valid asymptotically, we apply the finite sample adjustment used by STATA: N-
1/(N-k) * M/(M-1), where N is the number of observations, k the number of regressors including the 
constant and M the number of clusters.  
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infrastructure quality, where primary roads are expected to provide better road safety 
outcomes than secondary roads.  
Finally we also control by the level of alcohol consumption, the level of upper secondary 
graduates and the share of young males in the country. The first variable is expected to 
provide positive and significant impacts on road fatalities, as the medical and economics 
literature agree, and its discouragement is known to promote road safety (Ruhm, 1996; 
Moskowitz and Fiorentino, 2000; Eisenberg, 2003; Albalate, 2008). The second is a variable 
not usually employed to determine road safety outcomes. Nonetheless, it is usually 
suggested that the degree of education may play a role in the fulfillment of laws and rules 
and it is also responsible of driver attitudes and behavior. For this reason we additionally 
test whether this aggregate level of education enjoyed by a country may play a role in 
determining road safety outcomes. 
The last covariate is the share of young males in the country. Again, many studies provide 
evidence on the vulnerability of young drivers, especially males, to road fatalities. For this 
reason we expect to find positive relationships between the share of this age-gender group 
and the rate of road fatalities. For instance, Noland (2003) already found strong effect on 
age cohort variables when using states as the unit of spatial analyses.  
Data on all these variables are obtained from international databases, like Eurostat, WHO 
Europe, World Bank Development indicators, and the World Road Statistics. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
 
In table 4 our results are displayed. Specification (1) uses the variable motorways as 
regressor to include both free and tolled motorways in order to show the expected 
relationship between the best infrastructure and road fatalities. As is shown, the coefficient 
associated to this covariate is negative and highly significant. Therefore, without any 
distinction between price regimes, motorways seem to favor road safety. The rest of 
variables provide the expected signs. Only the coefficients associated to Primary roads, 
Education and Young males are not apparently statistically significant. 
 
<< Insert table 4 about here >> 
 
Also, it is interesting what we find in infrastructure variables. As mentioned, motorways 
favor road safety, primary roads are not statistically significant and secondary roads are 
associated to more road fatalities. Therefore, we find some kind of decreasing relationship 
between infrastructure quality and fatalities if we take into account the size, sign and 
statistical significance of their coefficients. This result is consistent with Albalate (2008) in 
Research Institute of Applied Economics 2008                                         Working Papers 2008/02, 18 pages
11
which only the variable motorways and primary roads are introduced and also with Flahaut 
(2004) where 2+2 lane configuration (2 lanes in each direction, both directions physically 
separated) is associated to the smallest probability of black zone. Moreover, he finds that 2 
lane configuration without physical separation is by far the most unsafe road configuration 
and this is the usual road type of secondary roads.  
In our results, motorways do provide the best results, while primary roads are not 
statistically significant and its coefficient is positive but very small in comparison with the 
rest of coefficients. Nonetheless, the one associated to secondary roads is positive, larger in 
comparison and statistically significant. Consequently, we find a decreasing relationship 
between infrastructure quality and road fatalities. 
More related to the core of our analysis and our empirical contribution are results from 
specification (2), where we distinguish between free and tolled motorways. As is shown, 
free motorways are strongly related to road safety and its coefficient is quite large. In fact it 
is larger than the coefficient associated to the motorways’ variable of specification (1). On 
the contrary, toll motorways do not seem to play any role on overall road fatalities. Its 
coefficient is not statistically significant in contrast with free motorways.  
This result seems to suggest that only free motorways promote road safety. Since quality 
standards are similar in both price regimes as stated in the introduction, we do not expect 
to find more accidents in toll motorways than in free motorways. In fact, safety outcomes 
in toll motorways are as satisfying as the ones reported by free motorways. Thus, there are 
reasons to believe that different impacts on road safety from different pricing strategies 
may be produced not in the motorways network (free or tolled) but in the alternative road 
network that competes against them, giving support to the hypothesis tested in the current 
study which is that pricing motorways prevents the use of the best infrastructure by those 
not willing to pay for its use. These drivers must use lower quality roads and the accident 
risk suffered in the corridor is higher than that generated by free motorways which allow 
the use of the better road without price exclusion.  
Again, in specifications (3) and (4) this result is consistent. In the first case we replicate 
the estimation but now controlling for heteroskedasticity while in the second we allow for 
any pattern of correlation by using a cluster robust estimation. In both cases we find that 
free motorways are strongly and positively related to road safety while toll motorways do 
not play an statistically significant role. Again, the coefficient associated to free motorways 
is significantly larger. 
To sum up, in this section we have found that even using aggregate data, there are 
reasons to believe that establishing tolls prevents the achievement of better road safety 
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outcomes. Since the presence of motorways is strongly correlated to lower road fatalities 
we should expect similar coefficients and strong relationships independently from the 
pricing regimes. Nonetheless, we find that in our two way fixed effects estimation only free 
motorways are associated to statistically significant impacts on overall safety across 
specifications. On the contrary, toll motorways do not play any statistically significant role 
and its coefficient is significantly smaller than the one associated to free motorways. 
Our results lead to important public policy implications in the field of transportation and 
infrastructure management. Pricing motorways prevents to fully exploit the best 
infrastructure virtues from motorways, which are connecting two points in short time 
periods under the safest standards, since a group of drivers which are not willing to pay for 
using the motorway are shifted to alternative roads. Thus, more investment on 
maintenance and quality should accompany toll establishment when the policy maker still 
considers the importance of tolling the best road. Following the rationale defended in the 
present paper, this investment must be devoted to improve safety in the adjacent 
alternative routes which receive diverted traffic from the tolled motorway. Nevertheless, 
conflicts of interest can emerge from this proposal, since this may find the opposition of 
the toll motorway concessionaire affected by the quality level of its competing road (Engel, 
Fischer and Galetovic, 2004). 
Another alternative for regulators and transport managers is the internalization of 
accident externalities by lowering tolls to improve safety outcomes in the corridor. This 
solution is close related to the literature on second-best pricing in road networks. In 
Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld (1996) and Rowendal and Verhoef (2003) we find that first 
best pricing reduces congestion on the toll road through the fare, but does not take into 
account the level of congestion suffered in the alternative untolled road which receives the 
users diverted from the tolled one. Therefore, drivers shifted to congested untolled roads 
aggravate its congestion. As a result, first- best pricing ignores the spill-overs on the free 
roads and it is necessary to set second-best tolling which internalizes congestion across the 
whole network. This implies a downward adjustment of tolls below first best levels.10  
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The use of tolls is becoming widespread around the world by their ability to solve budget 
constraints and avoid tax rises when governments need to face infrastructure enlargements 
or quality improvements. However, as is shown in the present paper, toll establishment 
10 Also see Viton (1995) and de Palma and Lindsey (2000) for analyses of private toll roads competing with 
untolled alternatives. 
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may be associated with road unsafety in a moment in which this is an increasing concern 
that worries transportation authorities and policy makers.  
In this study we have used an international European panel and a two way fixed effects 
estimation to show that price regimes in motorways may make a difference on road safety 
outcomes even using aggregate country data. In fact, we provide econometric evidence on 
the positive impacts produced by free motorways on road safety outcomes while at the 
same time, we highlight that tolled motorways lose this virtue. The explanation behind this 
result is related to the so-called re-routing or rat-running effects, which relate toll 
establishment to traffic diversion onto lower quality roads. 
This result leads to important public policy implications in the field of transportation and 
infrastructure management. More investment on maintenance and quality should 
accompany toll establishment when the policy maker still considers the importance of 
tolling the best road, and this investment must be devoted to improve safety in the adjacent 
alternative routes which receive diverted traffic from the tolled motorway. An alternative 
for regulators and transport managers is the internalization of accident externalities by 
lowering tolls to improve safety outcomes in the corridor. In our framework, priced-off 
drivers diverted onto lower quality roads are more prone to suffer accidents and therefore, 
tolling best infrastructures ignoring this effect may encourage road crash increases. Again, a 
downward adjustment of tolls may be necessary to internalize this perverse spill-over.  
Finally, this study provides interesting results for both road safety and transportation 
literatures, opening a new concern which requires deeper understanding and consequently 
further research. Regarding road safety literature, we put new light on the importance of 
pricing infrastructures in terms of accidentality in alternatives, being this another risk factor 
not treated before. At the same time, we add an interesting concern which empirically 
complements the literature on transport externalities in a similar framework of those 
theoretical studies based on both financial tolls and congestion charging. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
  
Table 1 Road traffic injuries as a leading cause of death in the world, sorted by age groups (2002) 
 
Age 
Position in ranking of  
leading causes of death 
Road Traffic  
Fatalities 
0-4 13 49,736 
5-14 2 130,835 
15-29 2 302,208 
30-44 3 285,457 
45-59 8 221,776 
All ages 11 1,183,492 
Source: Adapted from The World Health Organization (2004) 
 
 
 
Table 2. Definition of variables and descriptive statistics. 
Variable Definition Mean Std.Deviation 
Growth Rate of change (%) of the Real GDP, 
 PPP$ per capita. 2.750 2.617 
Vehicle-km Annual number passenger cars-Km 
expressed in 1000 million km and 
weighted by the national population. 
9.146 2.452 
Motorization Number of passenger cars per 1000 
inhabitants 418.536 93.768 
Motorways Proportion in % of Motorways (km) 
over the total road network. 
1.312 0.935 
Free Motorways Proportion in % of Free Motorways 
(km) over the total road network 
  1.036 0.0712 
Toll Motorways Proportion in % of Tolled Motorways 
(km) over the total road network 
0.278 0.0324 
Primary roads Proportion in % of Primary roads (km) 
over the total road network 
8.942 5.105 
Secondary roads Proportion in % of Secondary roads 
(km) over the total road network 
1.838 0.393 
Alcohol  Alcohol consumption in litres per 
capita 
11.215 0.173 
Education % Population between 16-64 years old  
with upper secondary education. 55.911 18.270 
Young males % Males between 20 and 29 years old 
over total Population 
7.578 0.056 
 
 
 
Table 3. Definition of variables and descriptive statistics. 
Covariates Expected relationship 
Growth + 
Vehicle-km + 
Motorization - 
Motorways - 
Free Motorways - 
Toll Motorways +/- 
Primary roads +/- 
Secondary roads +/- 
Alcohol  + 
Education +/- 
Young males + 
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Table 4. Least-squares estimates for semi-log models. (N = 195) 
Covariates FE 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
FE (Heterosk.) 
(3) 
FE (Clusters) 
(4) 
Growth 0.0080** 
(2.33) 
0.0080** 
(2.33) 
0.0080** 
(2.04) 
0.0080 
(1.41) 
Vehicle-km 0.0504* 
(1.97) 
0.0520* 
(1.97) 
0.0520* 
(1.76) 
0.0520 
(1.05) 
Motorization -0.0017*** 
(-3.96) 
-0.0018*** 
(-3.49) 
-0.0018*** 
(-3.99) 
-0.0018** 
(-2.59) 
Motorways -0.0528*** 
(-3.28) 
- - - 
Free Motorways - -0.0546*** 
(-3.31) 
-0.0546*** 
(-4.08) 
-0.0546** 
(-2.90) 
Toll Motorways - -0.0373 
-(0.66) 
-0.0373 
(-0.67) 
-0.0373 
(-0.54) 
Primary roads 0.0028 
(1.04) 
0.0028 
(1.04) 
0.0028 
(1.48) 
0.0028 
(1.20) 
Secondary roads 0.0770* 
(1.69) 
0.0743 
(1.60) 
0.0743 
(1.34) 
0.0743* 
(2.08) 
Alcohol  0.0222** 
(2.49) 
0.0218** 
(2.44) 
0.0218** 
(2.31) 
0.0218* 
(1.76) 
Education 0.0037 
(1.65) 
0.0040 
(1.64) 
0.0040 
(1.43) 
0.0040 
(1.08) 
Young males 0.0021 
(0.15) 
0.0012 
(0.08) 
0.0012 
(0.06) 
0.0012 
(0.04) 
R2 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 
Notes: Two-way fixed effects estimation. Each model includes time and country dummy variables and a  
constant term. t-statistics are presented in parenthesis. 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1%  level. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 Length of toll motorway network of European ASECAP members (Km). (1996-2006). 
Source: ASECAP (2007). Statistical Bulletin.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Rate of fatalities by million population. EU-15 countries. (1991-2005) 
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